Both men insist that Iran is fomenting a plot against the j West; and that the World Trade Center bombing is an example of terror-; ist activities that are part of this plot. The author examines these ;
claims and argues that they are not credible, that all of the evidence i they cite is circumstantial, and that much of it is contradictory. He ; concludes that the conspiracy does not exist. He suggests that both men are confronting dangerous security situations at home, and are j having difficulty coping with these situations. They hope to enlist tne aid of the United States to maintain themselves in power. The author suggests that this call to mount a war on so-called Islamic 1 terrorism is potentially damaging to U.S. security in the Middle East. i
Specifically, it could complicate the ability of the American military f to guard vital U.S. interests in this part of the world.
FOREWORD

The President of Egypt and Prime Minister of Israel have urged President
Clinton to join with them in a "war on Islamic terror." Both men insist that Iran is fomenting a plot against the West; and that the World Trade Center bombing is an example of terrorist activities that are part of this plot. This study examines these claims and argues that they are not credible, that all of the evidence they cite is circumstantial, and that much of it is contradictory. The author concludes that the conspiracy President Mubarak and Prime Minister Rabin are warning of does not exist.
Dr. Pelletiere speculates on what is in the minds of the two leaders and why they have raised the issue of Islamic terrorism. He suggests that both are confronting dangerous security situations at home, which they are having difficulty coping with. They hope t o e n k t the aid of the United States t o maintain themselves in power.
The author suggests that this call to mount a war on so-called lslamic terrorism is potentially damaging t o U.S. security in the Middle East. Specifically, it could complicate the ability of the American military to guard vital U.S. interests in this part of the world. There is no doubt that in Egypt numerous small religious groups exist and that some perpetrate violence against the government. However, t o say that these groups collectively constitute an entity, or that they are actively cooperating with each other is not warranted on the basis of the evidence w e have.
Indeed, many of the groups Mubarak has cited as belonging t o the jama'a appear t o have died long ago. Having been penetrated by the police, they disbanded. Others were never meant to survive. Called into life to perform a specific action (as, for example, the assassination of Sadat) they disbanded once that was done." The bottom line is that no one can state with any definiteness that the jama'a is a real organization.
It is particularly difficult to accept Mubarak's claims when one knows something of the jama'afs past history. In 1990 those Egyptians willing t o believe it existed, also felt it could not be more than a minor offshoot of the larger and infinitely more influential Muslim Brotherhood.'* They felt that the jama'a comprised all the little groups that the Brotherhood used for violent acts it sponsored, but with which it did not wish t o be associated.
However, after Saddam Husayn invaded Kuwait, the Brotherhood took a stand with the Saudis, on the side of the coalition. A t that point it became respectable, in much the same way as did Syria when it also took a proSaudilcoalition stand.13 Mubarak toned down his attacks against it. Instead, it was the jama'a he warned against; it was the head of all the opposition forces in Egypt.
This is really too neat. Significant terrorist organizations do not come into being overnight. Mubarak must tell us h o w the jama'a moved fr Jm relative obscurity t o occupy such a commanding presence in this short space of time.
Mubarak could satisfy skeptics, if he were t o offer concrete evidence of an Iranian tie. However, he has not done this, and without it the whole plot theory is unconvincing. Egyptians are notoriously arrogant when it comes t o politics, and hence it is hard t o see why they would take direction from outsiders, particularly
Iranians.14 As an Egyptian told the author in 1990, Egyptians don't import political movements, they export them. The Situation in Israel.
While these events were unfolding in Egypt, violence perpetrated by Muslims cropped up in Israel. There, the Israeli governmment had been battling the socalled intifadah ("uprising"). This was an internal revolt, and in that respect it differed markedly from the activity of t r~e Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).
The PLO has led the fight against Israel since 1968, but it has never been able to establish bases inside the occupied territories, largely because of the tight security lsrael maintained. The media said the shaykh had ties to the jama'a, and thus the inference was that the accused were members.25 This, they denied.
As other details of the bombing came out, the affair became more and more curious. If *.vhat the government was claiming was true, the accused were certainly not professional terrorists; indeed, they were the rankest amateurs. Mubarak's Dilemma.
E~y p t ' s President Mubarak presides over a country that is an economic
disaster. With over 70 million people-the overwhelming majority of whom are farmers-and with a limited supply of arable land, Egypt has barely been making ends meet for decades.
Until recently Mubarak could make do on the basis of remittances from overseas. Egyptians are willing workers and will travel the globe in search of jobs.
They send money home-quite a bit of it-which fuels the local economy. But then abruptly the bottom dropped out of the overseas job market.28
This left Mubarak dependent on loans, mainly from the World Bank.
Fortunately for him, the Bank was disposed to help out. However, the Bank does not lend money unconditionally. It wants Egypt t o open its economy. To that end, the Bank required that reforms be undertaken. It asked that Mubarak sell off enterprises in Egypt's public sectore2' This, the Bank feels, will create a class of Egyptian entrepreneurs who can move the country towards capitalism.
In the eyes of Egypt's poor, however, this entrepreneurial class is an abomination. It flaunts its wealth; it spends lavishly on consumer goods which the average Egyptian cannot hope to possess; it behaves in ways that pious Muslims deplore.
To be sure, impoverishment has been a condition of life in Egypt long before
Mubarak. However, in previous times-and particularly this was the case under Nasser-the contrast between haves and have-nots was much less stark. People who had money hid it away, fearing the socialist government would sequester it.
Once Mubarak-and this was also true of his predecessor, Sadat-began promoting consumerism, previously repressed class antagonism exploded. predecessor Sadat -for introducing this "filth" into E g~p t .~' Mubarak fought back by arresting some of the more outspoken imams, and this produced a certain tension in Egypt, which erupted last December after the devastating earthquake.
The Situation Polarizes.
Mubarak's government was derelict in getting aid to the quake victims.
Whole communities rioted and Mubarak saw in this the elements of a plot. He claimed that outside agitators-from Iran-had stirred the communities to revolt.32
Mubarak ordered his police to cordon off one of the poorest districts of Cairo and make a sweep through it looking for terrorist^."^^ The raid ended with some 400 persons being arrested, who were among the district's more pious residents.
After the raid, riots broke out all over Egypt and several foreign tourists were 
Mubarak Chooses Sides.
In January, Mubarak ordered his police to invade a mosque in southern Egypt, a stronghold of extremism, he charged.34 Twenty-one worshipers were killed by the police gunfire. Mubarak portrayed this as a necessary action, given the threat to which Egypt is exposed. Indeed, in an interview in The Washington
Post, Mubarak appeared to be exploiting the incident to gain sympathy from the West. He said, ". . .terrorism is a plague spreading all over the world and it calls for international cooperation to resist this unhealthy p h e n~m e n o n . "~~
It appears Mubarak aims t o enhance his financial backing from the United
States, and is doing so by laying down a challenge to the fundamentalists.
Mubarak said, "If they continue t o attack tourists, I shall be very strict with them." This is the same sort of tough line that Sadat took just before he was assassinated, and so it is surprising t o see Mubarak pursuing it also. For the United States, which has invested heavily in Egypt, this is a disturbing turn of events.37
The Case of Israel. It is important t o be aware, however, of who is pitted against whom in this struggle-it is the local community (both in Egypt and in Israel) against the police. Egyptians and Israelis will provide us with the expertise and on-the-spot resources t o attack the terrorists, w e will provide primarily the financial means.
U.S. policymakers may decide to go along with this antiterrorism war. In one respect it would be tempting t o do. The United States cannot tolerate the overthrow of Mubarak and Rabin. As difficult as these regimes are, they are better than the alternative-if that is some form of fundamentalism which certainly would be against U.S. interests.45
A t the same time, however, w e should not delude ourselves. If w e decide t o agree t o the "terror war," w e will not be the principal beneficiaries. It will not be a case of the Israelis and Egyptians doing us a favor; it will be the other way around. Washington will have t o prop up t w o governments under assault.
Essentially, this would be the deal.
If this were all that were involved, it might not be a problem of national concern. Unfortunately, however, much more is at stake. Our whole Middle East policy is on the line, as it were, and w e will look at this aspect of the problem now.
U.S. Policy in the Middle East. Furthermore the Mubarak-Rabin "terror war" is dangerous from another angle-it will confuse our current Middle East policy. We have a policy now that is workable-namely to focus our resources on guarding the Gulf, the region from which we are increasingly deriving our energy supplies. For the military to perform its mission, it mclst maintain a forward presence, and work closely with the Gulf monarchs, as in DESERT STORM.
If we join the "terror war," we will, in effect, be creating a whole new policy, in addition to the one we already have. Inevitably the two will conflict. One group with which we almost certainly will have trouble is the Gulf monarchs, who mistrust the Egyptians and hate and fear the I~raelis.~'
Reassuring the Monarchs.
After DESERT STORM, for the first time since the end of World War II, the United States obtained a military presence in the Gulf. It did so by gaining the trust of the Gulf monarchs, and impressing on them that we are their last line of defense. Subsequently, we worked out a number of bilateral security arangements which will enable us to sustain U.S. presence in the area.
To be sure, many in Washington disapproved this course of action, deeming the monarchs unworthy of America's support. However, Gulf oil is vital to America's welfare, and the oil is physically possessed by the monarchs. Those who advocate cutting ties to them must prcpose an alternate energy policy, one that is practical and can be put into effect. To date, no one has done thism4'
This author believes we have a great deal going for us in the Gulf right now.
More than anything, we have a foundation on which to build. To follow the Mubarak-Rabin initiative would be to regress.
The Surrogate Problem.
Mubarak and Rabin want t o function as our surrogates in the Persian Gulf.
Mubarak, at least, has already tried t o set himself up as such, and was summarily rebuffed b y the monarchs. Just after Operation DESERT STORM, he and Syrian ruler Hafez Assad crafted an agreement whereby they would cooperate with the monarchs t o defend the area.
After the monarchs had seemingly agreed, nothing happened, and it soon became apparent that as far as the monarchs were concerned the agreement was meaningless. The fact is that they distrust the Egyptians and Syrians, and are unwilling t o hand over their security to either, and certainly not t o a combination of both.
As for Israel, no Arab state really trusts the Israelis, and were Washington to make Tel Aviv its surrogate in the area, this would alienate the entire region against us.
Thus w e have no alternative except t o guard our vital resources ourselves. This is CENTCOM's job, and w e should be concentrating on facilitating its operations. Linking up with Mubarak and Rabin would complicate the command's mission enormously.
In the end this comes down t o the question of priorities-to agree t o the "terror war" w e must undercut-or at least vitiate-our present policy in the Middle East. Resources the military requires t o build a strong presence in the Gulf will be siphoned off t o fight suppostitious Islamic terrorist groups. It is conceivable, for example, that essential programs like sea and air lift will be sacrificed as Congress prefers t o focus on the "terror war."
The irony is that the United States has gone through all this once before.
Essentially, the course Mubarak and Rabin are urging us to pursue is the same that we followed with the Shah of Iran. The Egyptians and Israelis, in effect, want to become the policemen of the Persian Gulf, which is the role that the Shah tried to play. That whole experience with the Shah in the 1970s ultimately proved a debacle. Why should we make the same mistake twice? 
26.
The first suspect arrested (the man accused of renting the van used to carry the explosives) allegedly went back three times to the rental agency from which he had rented it to report it stolen. This was after the bombing had occurred. He wanted his deposit back. He also had in his wallet the card of the second man implicated in the plot. Moreover, in applying to rent the van he gave as references individuals subsequently arrested. Several suspects made no attempt to leave the country after the bombing, even though all apparently knew that the FBi had the mosque under surveillance. For the FBI's pre-bombmg investigation of the Jersey City mosque see "U.S. Reportedly 'Refused' t o Extricate 'Abd-al-Rahman," A1 Ahram Press Agency, December 9, 1992. I + 1 1 q < been suggested that these amateur terrorists constitute an even greater thredt to world security than the old protessional variety (see "New Kind of Terrorist,
